Napoleon Bonaparte: The Hundred Days, Waterloo & the Last Campaign
Napoleon Bonaparte returned from exile in 1815 and rebuilt an army and government quickly enough to force Europe into one final campaign. Waterloo was not the battle that created his reputation; it was the battle that ended his ability to recover political power by military force.
From revolutionary officer to emperor
Napoleon rose through the French Revolutionary Wars and became First Consul after the coup of 1799. He crowned himself Emperor of the French in 1804 and spent the following decade reshaping Europe through war, alliance and political reform.
His armies demonstrated extraordinary operational speed and concentration, but the system also depended on repeated mobilisation, conquest and the ability to defeat coalitions before their combined strength became overwhelming.
Defeat, Elba and return
After the disastrous Russian campaign of 1812 and the coalition victories that followed, Napoleon abdicated in April 1814 and was exiled to Elba. The Bourbon monarchy returned under Louis XVIII while the victorious powers met at Vienna.
Napoleon escaped Elba in February 1815, landed in France and regained power during the Hundred Days. European governments quickly declared him an outlaw and renewed their alliance. He now faced a strategic problem he understood well: defeat separate enemy armies before they could concentrate.
The campaign in Belgium
Napoleon moved north against the Anglo-Allied army under Wellington and the Prussian army under Blücher. On 16 June he defeated the Prussians at Ligny while Marshal Ney fought Wellington at Quatre Bras.
Ligny was a victory but not the destruction Napoleon required. The Prussians withdrew toward Wavre and remained in supporting distance of Wellington. Napoleon detached Marshal Grouchy to follow them while the main French army turned toward Wellington.
Waterloo
On 18 June Napoleon attacked Wellington’s position at Mont-Saint-Jean. The French plan had to break the Anglo-Allied army before Prussian intervention became decisive.
Hougoumont drew in repeated attacks. D’Erlon’s corps assaulted the Allied left-centre. Massed cavalry attacks failed to break infantry squares. The capture of La Haye Sainte created a dangerous opportunity in the centre, but by then Prussian pressure around Plancenoit was forcing Napoleon to divert reserves.
The final Imperial Guard attack failed. With Prussian forces arriving in strength and Wellington’s army counter-attacking, French cohesion collapsed.
Command and the problem of time
Napoleon’s operational method had often relied on speed and concentration. In June 1815 the same principle remained sound: keep the coalition armies apart and defeat them in sequence. The failure was not that the idea was absurd. It was that Ligny did not remove the Prussian army, Quatre Bras did not remove Wellington, and the coalition retained enough communication and mutual support to reunite at the decisive moment.
Waterloo therefore illustrates the limit of operational brilliance when the political and strategic balance has changed. Napoleon could still win battles; he could no longer afford a campaign in which enemy armies survived to combine.
After Waterloo
Napoleon returned to Paris and abdicated for a second time on 22 June 1815. He eventually surrendered to the British and was exiled to Saint Helena, where he died in 1821.
Why Napoleon matters
His legacy extends far beyond Waterloo: administration, law, military organisation, nationalism and the political map of Europe were all shaped by the Napoleonic era. For the Hundred Days, however, the important point is narrower. Napoleon returned with enough authority and military skill to threaten the post-1814 settlement, but not with enough strategic margin to survive coalition concentration.
Related: Battle of Waterloo field guide · Hundred Days campaign guide · Political road to the Hundred Days · Egypt 1798–1801 political guide
