Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pulleine: Command at Isandlwana
Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Burmester Pulleine was left in command of the British camp at Isandlwana on the morning of 22 January 1879 after Lord Chelmsford moved away with a large part of No. 3 Column. By early afternoon Pulleine was dead and the camp had been destroyed by the main Zulu army.
An organiser placed into a battlefield crisis
Pulleine had long service and a strong reputation for administration and organisation, including work during the Cape Frontier fighting, but comparatively little experience of commanding a major action in the field. That distinction matters because Isandlwana became a rapidly changing command problem rather than a routine camp defence.
He had five companies of 1/24th, one company of 2/24th, two Royal Artillery guns, colonial mounted troops, African auxiliaries and support personnel. The force later increased with the arrival of Anthony Durnford and elements of No. 2 Column.
The command problem
Durnford was senior by rank, but the orders governing his arrival did not clearly define a transfer of command. The two officers therefore operated in an awkward arrangement while reports of Zulu movement accumulated around the camp.
Pulleine had been instructed to defend the camp. When Durnford moved out to investigate the enemy, Pulleine did not send the infantry companies Durnford initially requested, but later had to extend his line in an effort to support the wider position as the scale of the attack became clear.
An over-extended defence
The 24th’s companies initially fired effectively and portions of the Zulu advance were checked. The problem was geometry. The line covered too much ground, the camp behind it was not fortified, and the Zulu horns continued working around both flanks.
Once companies began falling back, the relationship between units broke down quickly. Ammunition movement, visibility, command and the need to avoid encirclement all collided at once. Pulleine’s exact death was never conclusively established; he did not escape the battlefield.
Responsibility and hindsight
It is easy to make Pulleine the explanation for Isandlwana because he was the officer physically left in the camp. That is too simple. His decisions matter, but so do Chelmsford’s decision to split the force, the unfortified camp, ambiguous orders, the intelligence picture and the speed and skill with which the Zulu army concentrated.
That does not remove command responsibility. It puts it at the correct level. Isandlwana was a system failure exploited by an enemy that manoeuvred faster than the British command system could respond.
Why Pulleine matters
Pulleine is useful precisely because he was not a famous battlefield commander before the disaster. He represents the officer who inherits a situation built by decisions above and around him, then has very little time to turn fragments of information into a coherent defence.
Related: Isandlwana field guide · Lord Chelmsford · Anthony Durnford · Ntshingwayo kaMahole
